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RECENT

CASES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PRIMARY JURISDICTION-LABOR-INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT-For more than forty years, two crafts perform-

ing similar braking duties have existed on the St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway. The membership of one, the train porter craft, is restricted to
Negroes, while the other, the brakeman's craft, has been open only to
the white race. In order to avert a strike which was threatened if the
carrier continued to employ train porters in braking jobs, the railway
agreed with the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the collective bargaining representative of the brakemen's craft, not to employ train porters
in performing such duties. As a result of this agreement, notice was
given to the porters that their employment would be terminated. A class
suit was subsequently brought on behalf of the train porters to prevent
their imminent discharge.- In reversing the District Court determination
that the National Railway Adjustment Board had primary jurisdiction over
this dispute, 2 the Court of Appeals permanently enjoined the use of the
agreement for any purpose other than as a consolidation of the two crafts.3
Howard v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 191 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1951).
The Railway Labor Act provides for the establishment of the National
Railroad Adjustment Board,4 a quasi-judicial body empowered to render
judicially enforceable decisions in controversies arising out of the interpretation of contracts between carriers and labor organizations. 5 Disputes
non-justiciable in nature are within the jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board. 6 There is no specific provision in the Act concerning the
jurisdiction of courts to interpret and apply agreements; consequently
there has been considerable difficulty in determining whether a court or
the agency should make initial decisions in railway labor disputes. A prior
administrative finding has been held not to be a prerequisite to a suit in
1. Howard v. Thompson, 72 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
2. Primary jurisdiction is a principle which determines whether the court or the
agency should make the initial decision. The problem arises when statutory arrangements are such that administrative and judicial jurisdiction are concurrent for the
initial decision of some questions. DAvis, ADMINISTRATmvE LAW 664 (1st ed. 1951).
3. 44 STAT. 582 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. §156
(1946), provides-for at least thirty days notice of any intent to change agreements
affecting pay, rules or working conditions. Both the District Court and the Circuit
Court found the notice given inadequate.
4. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 48 STAT. 1185 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153
(1946). The Board is the first administrative tribunal (federal or state) of its kind.
Garrison, The National Railroad Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative
Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
5. The First Division of The National Railroad Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over disputes involving the train and yard service employees of carriers. This
division is made up of five carrier members and five labor members.
6. 48 STAT. 1193 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 154 (1946). This three man impartial
board was created along with the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
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court on the contract for a wrongful discharge. 7 However when the problem arose as to the power of a district court, having charge of a railway
reorganization, to adjudicate a dispute between two unions both claiming
the right to man certain trains, the Supreme Court decided that injunctive
relief should be withheld until the Adjustment Board could first pass on
the issue.8 Where a railroad which had collective agreements with two
unions sought a declaratory judgment in a state court to the effect that
one agreement and not the other covered certain jobs in controversy, the
administrative agency was held to have primary jurisdiction.9 Thus, although the Railway Labor Act provides that disputes "may" be referred
to the Board and not that they "shall" be as is provided elsewhere, the trend
in Supreme Court cases has been toward enlarging the scope of the primary
jurisdiction of the agencies established by the Act. Some of the factors
which have been considered in deciding whether a court or the agency
should initially adjudicate are: the intricacy and technical nature of the
factual questions involved, 10 Congressional intent in establishing expert
bodies," the importance of prospective as well as retrospective effect of
the action, 12 and the adequacy of the administrative remedy.'3 As the
court viewed the instant case, the issue was simply the right of one group
of employees to hold their jobs in the face of an attempt by another group
to coerce the employer into discharging them. It would seem that no
special experience or expertise is required to pass upon such an issue and
that a court of equity is as well qualified to decide the question as the
administrative agency. Moreover, the history and the purpose of the Railway Labor Act show that it was primarily meant to aid in the settlement of
7. Moore v. Illinois Central Ry., 312 U.S. 630 (1941) (The Court stated that the
adjustment system under the Railway Labor Act was voluntary in its nature and not
based upon legal compulsion).
8. Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry., 339 U.S. 239 (1950) (The Court held
that the district court had supervisory power to instruct its trustees, but that the instructions would not bind the Adjustment Board).
9. Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946) (The Court
pointed out in the course of the opinion that a court of equity could intervene where
the violation of individual or public rights was clearly shown).
10. "Preliminary resort to the Commission is required . . . because the enquiry
is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical matters; and uniformity can
only be secured if its determination is left to the Commission." Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Great Northern R.R. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
11. ".

.

. the problem of labor relationships in its manifold phases suffers con-

siderably from lack of adequate definition of rights and responsibilities,-a definition
impossible of formulation merely by legislation but capable, I believe, of being pricked
out coherently and justly by men ready to devote their lives to the task." Landis,
Significance of Administrative Comnmissions in the Growth of the Law, 12 IND. L.J.
471, 477 (1937).
12. In Texas & Pacific R.R. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907),
which is the leading case on the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the great need for
uniformity of policy in regard to carrier rate fixing, prompted the Court, in the face
of an unambiguous statute, to hold that the I.C.C. must initially pass on the reasonableness of rates. This was judicial legislation, but has been widely approved.
13. In the instant case the train porters maintained that the National Railroad
Adjustment Board is disqualified because all five of the labor members of the Board
represent unions which bar Negroes solely because of race. [Record, p. 167].
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disputes between employer and employee, 14 whereas the dispute in the instant case is essentially one between the colored and white employees. 15
Hence, the intent of Congress as expressed in the Act was not subverted
by the court in the principal case. A realistic analysis of the situation in
the case would seem to indicate that no mere jurisdictional dispute is involved where an entire class of employees is threatened with discharge because of pressure brought to bear by rivals for their jobs, and when the
basis of the rivalry is race hatred. Thus the court saw no need for the
6
Board to adjudicate the rights of the parties, initially or otherwise.'
Conduct which is intended to induce breach of contract, has long
been actionable in tort.' 7 Protection has also been extended against un8
justified interference with advantageous relations, not based on a contract.'
Thus, although employment is at the will of the parties, state legislation
9
which arbitrarily causes discharge has been held to be unconstitutional.'
Moreover, employment at will has been protected against private interference. 20 It has been recognized that the employee has a right to have
his employer free of coercion in the exercise of his will regarding the
employment relationship. To invoke liability, the interference must be
the proximate cause of the damage to the relations and it must be without
legal justification. The record in the instant case makes it clear that the
contract exacted by the brakemen was the sole cause of the plan of the
carrier to discharge the train porters. The problem of justification is
a difficult one, for very often the interference is prompted by mixed motives. Thus, while the removal of the train porters from their jobs would
afford some economic advantage to the brakemen, the circumstances show
that racial hostility was a potent factor in the. action of the Brotherhood
21
of Railroad Trainmen.
14. See Garrison, supra note 4.
15. The train porters are required to perform more work for less wages than the
white brakemen are paid. Hence it would seem to be of the advantage of the carrier to retain the train porters in their jobs. [Brief for the Appellant, pp. 5-11].
16. The court did however state that "In the decree which will be entered herein,
appropriate steps therefore will be taken to leave open the opportunity for safeguarding to them any victory as to their extraneous rights which they may succeed in establishing and to which they would be legally entitled, under the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act." Instant case at 449.
17. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
18. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (Defendant set up a
rival barber shop to drive the plantiff out of business).
19. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915). "The fact that the employment is at
the will of the parties, respectively, does not make it one at the will of others."
20. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526 (1904)
(Insurance carrier held liable in damages for forcing the employer to discharge the
plaintiff, under threat of cancellation of coverage, in order to force the employee to
compromise a claim).
21. The by-laws of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen excludes Negroes
from membership except in those states where such exclusion is illegal and in those
states it is done by means of the "Blackball" [Record, p. 287]. See Hewitt, The
Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. oF PA. L. REv. 919 (1951).
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Had the plaintiffs been obliged to take their case to the Railroad Adjustment Board, they would have had to wait at least two to two and a
half years before any hearing could possibly be had before the Board,
because of the congested condition of the Board's docket. Such delay
would certainly have been fatal to the cause of the train porters. While
temporary injunctive relief would have preserved the rights of the parties
2
until the Board could act, the injunction granted was made permanent.
Apparently the court felt that the enjoined agreement was so patently
invalid that any contrary finding by the Board would not be sustained.
The instant case points up the need for courts to be alert to the problems
arising when the primary jurisdiction doctrine is employed as a device
to delay the expeditious disposition of substantive questions. Manifestly
prior administrative resort should not be required where the reasons for
23

the rule are not present.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-ADOPTION OF FOREIGN LAW-IN ABSENCE OF
PLEADING OR PROOF OF FOREIGN LAW BY EITHER PARTY COURT WILL
PRESUME ACQUIESCENCE

IN APPLICATION

OF LAW OF THE FORUM-

Plaintiff loaned $1500 to defendant in France and brought an action for
the recovery of the money in New Jersey. Defendant moved for an involuntary dismissal on the ground that the plaintiff had not made out his
cause of action because he had neither pleaded nor proved the law of
France. The lower court denied defendant's motion, holding that the
absence of proof of French law was not fatal because the court could
presume that the law of France concerning loans was the same as other
civilized countries.' The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict of $1500,
and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that in the absence
of pleading or proof of foreign law by either party, the court will presume
that the parties acquiesce in having the law of the forum applied. Leary
v. Gledhill, 84 A.2d 725 (N. J. 1951).
When the rule of Conflict of Laws requires that foreign substantive
law be applied, but neither party has proved that law, several approaches
have been adopted by the courts. At common law courts simply refused
22. The use of injunctions by federal courts in labor disputes is limited by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, which restricts their use to certain enumerated situations.
An injunction may issue when the court finds that unlawful acts are threatened, that
substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property will follow such acts,
that greater injury will follow denial of relief than its grant, and that there is no
adequate remedy at law, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1946). Although
the court in the instant case did not specifically consider the effect of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, it seems clear that the use of the injunction was justified in light
of the findings made.
23. Certiorari has been granted, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3234 (March 4, 1951).
1. The lower court also denied the motion on the ground that the issue with respect to French law had not been set forth in the pre-trial order.
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to hear a case involving a transaction foreign to the jurisdiction.2 The
harsh results of this rule eventually brought the courts to the position
that a case dependent upon foreign law should not be dismissed, and that
foreign law could be proved as a fact.3 One of the greatest deficiencies
of this rule was that it placed the determination of complicated legal
problems in the hands of the jury.4 Even in cases like the instant one,
where the foreign law was neither pleaded nor proved, the courts are
still reluctant to nonsuit a plaintiff whose case depends upon that foreign
law. Instead they follow one of three courses. The first, and- once the
most prevalent, is to presume that the foreign law was the same as the
common law of the forum.5 This was premised on the fact that many
jurisdictions had a common law foundation.0 Most jurisdictions, therefore, apply this presumption by applying the law of the forum as it existed
before statutory changes. 7 A second course, and the one followed by the
lower court in the instant case, is to indulge in the presumption that all
civilized countries apply certain fundamental principles.8 A third course
open to the courts in the absence of pleading or proof of the foreign law
is to apply the law of the forum,9 even if it be statutory. 10 Today this
2. E.g., Smith v. Brown & Cooper, 2 Salk. 665, 91 Eng. Rep. 566 (1706). The
early English cases are discussed in Sack, Conflict of Laws in the History of English
Law, 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PRoGaxss 387-389 (1937).
3. One of the earlist cases to adopt this method of handling the foreign law problem was Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 (K.B. 1774). Recent cases recite this
formulation as a rule but do not demand proof as an essential part of the plaintiff's
case, if the issue is not raised. See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 160 Fla. 732, 36 So.2d
417 (1948).
4. For an excellent discussion of the techniques of proving foreign law and the
difficulties presented therein see Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law,
50 YALE L.J. 1018,-1023-1035 (1941).
5. E.g, St. Nicholas Bank v. State National Bank, 128 N.Y. 26, 27 N.E. 849
(1891). For a recent case to the same effect see Bussey v. Hager, 80 Ga. App. 23,
60 S.E.2d 532 (1950). Some courts have recognized that the common law of all
jurisdictions is not the same, and therefore have refused to indulge in the presumption. E.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul RR. v. Smith, 74 Ill. 197 (1874).
6. The technique used in this area was that the court would judicially notice
that both State X and the forum had a common law foundation and then would indulge in the presumption. See Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV.
L. REv. 401, 402 (1906).
7. E.g., Cherry v. Sprague, 187 Mass. 113, 72 N.E. 456 (1904).

8. E.g., Parrot v. Mexican Central Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911).
In note 7, supra, it is indicated that Massachusetts indulges in the common law presumption. However this case involved Mexican law, and that avenue was not open
to the court since Mexico did not have a common law foundation. There were some
cases, of course, where the courts could not resort to this type of presumption. E.g.,
In re Hall, 61 App. Div. 266, 70 N.Y. Supp. 406 (3d Dep't 1901), where the matter
involved was a common law marriage. The court noticed that the law of France
was not the common law and could go no farther.
9. E.g., Norris v. Harris, 15 Cal. 226 (1860). Texas, Louisiana and California
used this presumption principally because they had civil law foundations.
10. E.g., Pauska v. Davis, 31 Tex. 67 (1868) (statute law of Texas applied in
the absence of proof of Mexican law). For a recent case to the same effect see
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Kilpatrick, 231 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. App. 1950). This
method of handling the foreign law was in some instances called a presumption and
in others a rule of law. See Kales, supra note 6, at 411. If it was called a rule of
law the courts would refuse to discuss the foreign law on the ground that the forum
law was the only law of which they could take cognizance. See, e.g., Norris v.
Harris, supra note 9.
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last approach is the commonest," probably because the Uniform Judicial
Notice of Foreign Law Act 12 provides the mechanics for taking notice of
the laws of sister states, when those laws are brought to the attention of
the court. The courts apparently reason that, with this comparatively easy
method for presenting such matter to the court, the foreign law is the same
as that of the forum if a party, who would benefit by a different foreign
law, has not brought it before the court. However the Act does not aid
in the solution of the problem of the instant case, because it does not
permit notice of the laws of foreign countries.' 8 The court in the principal
case reached a result in accord with the modem trend of applying the
law of the forum unless the foreign law be shown to be different. It rejected the "civilized principle" presumption because, although that was
adequate for the factual situation in this case, the better general principle
would be a presumption of acquiescence by the parties in the application
of the law of the forum. 14
The latter presumption also reaches the same result as the usual presumption that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum, but
it adopts a more realistic rationale. In effect the court is saying that it
is an unnecessary fiction to presume that France and New Jersey have
the same law on this matter. The fact is that the parties, by failing to put
the French law in issue, indicate that they have resigned themselves to
accepting a determination of their case under local law. Quite obviously
the law of France and the law of New Jersey differ in many respects, but
the party who wishes to take advantage of these differences must show
them. In any case this rule, if strictly applied, places the burden of at
least going forward with the evidence on the party who wishes to take
*advantage of the foreign law variation. The court does not demand strict
application of this presumption, however, for it recognizes that a case may
arise where the presumption would place too great a burden on a defendant
-for example if the cost of such a defense would be prohibitive. Or it
might give the plaintiff an unwarranted advantage, e.g., opportunity to
avoid the foreign law where it is uncertain that he has a cause of action
under it. Recognizing these possibilities the court gives the trial judge,
in the exercise of his sound discretion, the power to refuse to apply any
presumption, and thereby require proof of the applicable foreign law.' 5
This rule, while avoiding the vague generality of the "civilized principle"
presumption, should also prevent one party from forcing the other to
11. See, e.g., Com. ex rel. Schnader v. National Surety Co., 349 Pa. 599, 37 A.2d
753 (1944). There is language to this effect in the opinions of almost all of the jurisdictions. Wherever possible the common law presumption is used, but with the increasing importance of statutes this presumption is increasingly used. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Curry, 243 Ala. 228, 9 So.2d 8 (1942).
12. 9 U.L.A. 401 (1951 Ed.). The Act has been adopted with some slight variations in twenty-four states. Many other states have similar statutes.
13. NJ. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, c. 98, § 32 (Supp. 1951).

14. Instant case at 730.
15. Ibid.
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assume the burden of proving a principle of foreign law merely for the
tactical advantage which will result from this burden. The number of
instances of litigation involving transactions in foreign countries will undoubtedly increase in the next few years, with the increasing number of
American citizens travelling abroad. 16 The New Jersey court has adopted
a simple, equitable, and realistic approach to the solution of the problem.

CORPORATIONS-EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER PRIVATE CORPORATIONS-EQUITABLE CLEAN-UP-COMMUNISTS CANNOT SERVE AS OFFICERS
OF CORPORATION THE PURPOSE OF WHICH Is THE PROMOTION OF AMER-

ICANISM-Petitioners are members of an association incorporated under
the laws of Pennsylvania I for the authorized purpose of educating its members to become worthy citizens and to obey the laws of the United States.2
They filed a bill in equity praying for injunctive relief, 3 alleging misappropriation of corporate funds, and that the officers, directors and certain of the
members were communists who were perverting the purposes of the
organization, excluding anti-communist members, and dissipating corporate assets for the spread of communism. At a lengthy hearing the court
took judicial notice of the avowed purposes of communism and found that
the allegations of the bill were true. A decree thereupon issued ordering
the corporation to expel the communists-both officers and members-and
to reinstate those who had been wrongfully excluded. The appellate court
4
unanimously affirmed the granting of the temporary injunction but remanded the cause to the lower court because only seven of the 23 members
found to be communists had been named as defendants and the order direct5
ing the reinstatement of the anti-communists was too vague. The remand
16. At the time of the transaction in the instant case plaintiff was a member of
the Armed Forces stationed in Europe. With the prospect of a permanent American
adjunct to a European Army, and the speed of international air travel the possibilities
that this problem will arise are greater than ever before.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1 et seq., as amended, § 2851-1 et seq. (Purdon
1938). Under § 2851-506 of this title, officers and directors of Pennsylvania corporations are in a fiduciary relationship with the organization they represent.
2. Members of the Serbian Progressive Club are apparently of predominantly
Serbian extraction, and the purpose of the organization is to acquaint the members
with the customs and traditions of this country.
3. The relief for which petitioner prayed is not perfectly clear. The briefs of
counsel do not contain the petition, nor is it set forth in the opinion of the court. In
addition to granting the temporary injunction, the lower court appointed a receiver
to maintain the status quo pendente lite. The entire record in the case is scanty and
the majority opinion twice referred to its inadequacy. Instant case at 28, 32, 84
A.2d at 572, 574.
4. While the affirmance of the temporary injunction was unanimous, Mr. Justice
Jones did not concur in the remainder of the majority opinion. He was of the opinion
that whether or not the defendants were members of the Communist Party was irrelevant. Instant case at 34, 84 A.2d at 575 (concurring opinion). See note 19
infra.
5.The second paragraph of the decree of the lower court ordered the expulsion
of 23 named persons. However, the third paragraph of the decree simply ordered
the reinstatement of those wrongfully expelled without specifically naming the parties
to be reinstated. Instant case at 29, 84 A.2d at 573.
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carried instructions to determine specifically who were communists and to
expel them, and to reinstate those found to be wrongfully excluded.
Milasinovich et at. v. Serbian ProgressiveClub et al., 369 Pa. 26, 84 A.2d
571 (1951).
Courts of equity have no inherent jurisdiction to enjoin or remove
corporate officers.0 However equity may acquire such jurisdiction either
by statute 7 or if some other ground of equitable jurisdiction is presented.8
In the latter instance, the courts speak of the doctrine of equitable clean-up,
which means simply that once equity has jurisdiction in a controversy it has
jurisdiction to determine all ancillary issues necessary for the final disposition of the cause.9 For example, if a corporate shareholder seeks injunctive
relief for fraud, waste or misapplication of assets, and the right to corporate
office is thereby brought into issue, the chancellor may restrain or remove
the incumbent and do whatever else is necessary to accomplish complete
and adequate relief.' 0 The decision in the instant case rests upon this doctrine since the allegations of fraud were found to be true. The chancellor
noticed that communism seeks the overthrow of legitimate government by
whatever means are available or necessary,"' and he found that the officers
2
were in fact communists9.
It was therefore necessary to order their expul6. 2 FLETcHER, CYcLoPEDIA OF Co.oRATioxs § 367 (Perm. ed. 1931) and cases
there cited. See, e.g., Deal v. Miller, 245 Pa. 1,90 At. 1070 (1914) ; Jenkins v.

Baxter, 160 Pa. 199, 28 At. 682 (1894).

7. Pennsylvania has a statutory remedy which provides: "Unless the articles or
by-laws otherwise provide, the court of common pleas of the county where the registered office of the corporation is located may, at the suit of five or more members,
remove from office any director or directors in case of fraudulent or dishonest acts, or
gross abuses of authority or discretion, with reference to the corporation, and may
bar from reelection any director so removed for a peiod prescribed by the court.
The corporation shall be made a party to such actions." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2851-503 (Purdon 1938). The decision in the instant case did not rest on this authority because one of the five plaintiffs was allegedly not a member at the time of
the suit. Instant case at 31, 84 A.2d at 574. There have been no Pennsylvania decisions under this section.
8. 2 FLETcHER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 368. See generally, Chaffee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L. REv. 993 (1930); Pound,
Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 id. 640 (1916).
Dean Pound summarizes equitable clean-up as "Something is found which gives the
camel's nose legitimate standing in the chancellor's tent, and the whole beast follows
in order to dispose of the case completely." Id. at 672. There is great judicial reluctance to delve into the internal affairs of non-profit corporations. 100 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 457 (1951).
9. See, e.g., Mower v. Mower, 367 Pa. 325, 80 A.2d 856 (1951); Bowman v.
Gum, Inc., 327 Pa. 403, 193 AtI. 271 (1937). See also Levin, Equitable Clean-Up
and the Jury, 100 U. OF PA. L. Pv. 320, 320-321 (1951).
10. See, e.g., Floor v. Johnson, 199 P.2d 547 (Utah 1948) (bill alleged the
fraudulent issue of voting stock and directors who were thereby elected were removed). See also 2 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 368 and cases there cited.
11. Taking judicial notice of communist objectives is common among the courts.

E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A.2d 43 (1941).
12. The evidence against the defendants was largely supplied by Matt Cvetic.
Brief for Appellants, p. 14. Cvetic testified that many of the defendants were active
communists and members of the Communist Party. Instant case at 29-30, 84 A.2d
at 573. Cvetic was an undercover agent for the F.B.I. who posed as a communist
and who has been a key witness in the trials involving communists of the Pittsburgh
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sion from the organization because a communist by definition cannot
honestly foster the principles of Americanism. Although it is ordinarily
understood that a corporate officer will not be removed without a showing
of specific acts of misconduct with regard to the corporation, such evidence
was not required here. Having noticed the irreconcilability of communist
objectives and the chartered purposes of the organization, and having
found the members to be communists, the court substituted these findings
for the required misconduct. By such a decision the court clearly brought
into focus the present status of communists in Pennsylvania.
Communists have been accorded a full measure of justice in Pennsylvania decisions, and the courts have established what may be termed a
relevancy test in dealing with cases involving the rights of communists.
While the opinion in the instant case is extremely vague and does not
specifically set forth the intention of the court, it would seem that the court
has not departed from its prior position. For example, it has been held
that a judge may not, in an ex parte proceeding, prevent a communist from
practicing in his court,13 nor prevent a communist from serving on a grand
jury.14 Similarly, counsel in a prosecution for rioting may not unreasonably
refer to defendants as "revolutionary communists" when that allegation
has not been substantiated. 15 The fact that a defendant is a communist is
legally irrelevant in a trial for assault and battery.'0 On the other hand,
the same courts have held that a school teacher 17 or a civil servant ' 8 may
area, Commonwealth v. Truitt et al., 369 Pa. 72, 85 A.2d 425 (1951); Appeal of
Dorothy Albert, 99 Pittsburgh 445 (C.P. 1951). Cvetic's story was recently told
in the motion picture, "I Was a Communist for the F. B. I."
13. Schlesinger Petition, 367 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316 (1951) (petitioner was attorney for plaintiff in a trespass action). The court in the instant case quoted the
following language from the Schlesinger opinion with approval: "It need hardly be
stated that this Court is as opposed to communism in all its manifestations as the
respondent Judge who instituted these contempt proceedings. But it is our sacred
duty to uphold the Constitutions and laws of our Country and State and their provisions as to due process of law. What the Judge has done, in his zeal against communism, is to adopt the detestable method employed by communists themselves
in arbitrary and unjudicial proceedings contrary to all our cherished traditions of
law and legal procedure." Id. at 483, 81 A.2d 319.
14. Commonwealth ex rel. Roth v. Musmanno, 364 Pa. 359, 72 A.2d 263 (1950).
The jurist in this case, and in the Schlesinger case, supra note 13, was Judge Musmanno who is now a member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Justice Musmanno had not become a member of the court at the time the instant case or the
Truitt case, supra note 12, were decided.
15. Commonwealth v. Forgione et al., 114 Pa. Super. 275, 173 Atl. 729 (1934).
16. Commonwealth v. Truitt et al., supra note 12. The Truitt case was decided
shortly after the instant case.
17. Appeal of Dorothy Albert, 99 Pittsburgh 445 (C.P. 1951) (Albert taught
English in a public high school and was found to be a member of the Civil Rights
Congress; the court judicially noticed the objectives of communism, and that the
organization had been designated communist by the Attorney General of the United
States. On this finding the dismissal of Albert was upheld).
18. Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Board, 146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A.2d
43 (1941) (Pawell and others were discharged from civil service positions because
they were active communists who had signed nominating petitions of the Communist
Party even though the dismissal could have been placed on dishonesty in swearing
that they were not communists. The rationale of such a decision seems to be that
an employee who has openly sworn to effect the destruction of his master cannot
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be discharged because of communist activity. The result in these latter
cases is distinguishable because there the existence of communist beliefs has
a direct and vital bearing on the activity in question. The obvious antagonism of principle which exists between communism and our way of life
makes the presence of communists justifiably undesirable in sensitive positions of public trust and pedagogic positions demanding a flexibility of approach. Thus the Pennsylvania test says that the communist activity must
have legal relevance to the activity under consideration before it becomes
a factor in the decision. The ambiguity of the instant opinion, however,
invites exploration of its possible ramifications. The decision can, of course,
be broadly interpreted to mean that a communist cannot serve any corporation, regardless of its purpose. Such an interpretation is unrealistic;
it is not only unwarranted in view of the earlier decisions, but it is illogical
since communism cannot be equated with general mismanagement. Interpreted more narrowly, the decision may mean that card-carrying members
of the Communist Party, or members of communist front organizations,
cannot serve the type of association found in the instant case. Such an
interpretation is also undesirable, for to expel an officer because he tended
toward communism is quite different from a showing that he was an active,
aggressive communist who actually pursued his convictions to the particular
detriment of the corporation in question. Such an interpretation would
disembowel the requirement of showing actual misconduct toward the corporation. This interpretation may be negatived by the court's pointed language that one accused of communist activity must be given a full, fair
and impartial hearing after proper confrontation, with ample opportunity
to defend. The court specifically condemned the decreeing of the status
of individuals by accusation and the finding of guilt by association. 9
Finally, the decision may be confined to its facts, that a proven communist
may not serve as an officer of a corporation chartered to foster Americanism.
The vagueness of the opinion does not foreclose any of these possibilities,
but if accorded the narrowest interpretation, the decision would seem to be
neither startling nor novel in view of the relevancy test established in other
fields.
Public opinion today is inexorably opposed to communism so that the
resultant tendency is the equation of communist activity with whatever is
required by a statute or a court decision for the imposition of penal, civil
be loyal to his master). Compare the provisions of the recent Pennsylvania Loyalty
Act (Pechan Act) Act No. 463, Pa. Legis. (Dec. 22, 1951). See also McAndrew
v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 365 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 180, 98 U. OF PA. L.
Ray. 931 (1950) (paper quoted political speaker as saying "we all have to have a
little communism today" and court held this was not libelous).
19. Instant case at 33, 84 A.2d at 574. See note 12 s=pra. There was proof in
the instant case that the officers were not only active communists but that they had
misappropriated the corporate funds. There seems to be some distinction between
a communist and a member of the Communist Party, which the court makes. Justice
Jones says, in the concurring opinion, that membership in the Communist Party is not
relevant, but does not discuss the relevance of actual communist activity. The
majority opinion discusses communists, but does not pass upon the relevance of
Communist Party membership. This apparent distinction may prove significant in
later cases of this type.

902

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

or social sanctions. As a result, freedom of expression and movement
have been curtailed; even the truest American may hesitate to speak frankly
lest in departing from orthodoxy he may become suspect as disloyal. With
the public as the supreme tribunal, with guilt found by association, the
standard of conduct becomes rigid orthodoxy and the suppression of legitimate, though unorthodox, opinion. Failing to spell out what it meant
by the decision, the instant court lent its support to this trend. The ultimate resolution of the ambiguity must await further judicial interpretation.

CORPORATIONS-PRE-EMPTIVE

RIGHTS-VOTING

RIGHTS-PROTEC-

amendment of a Delaware corporation's certificate of incorporation removed the pre-emptive rights of
the shareholders pursuant to a stock option plan in favor of certain officers
and employees. Plaintiff-shareholder's contention that her pre-emptive
right was a "vested" one was rejected, the court holding that the action
was within the broad language of § 26 of the Delaware Corporation Law
permitting amendments by vote of a majority of the shareholders to change
.. . other special rights of the shares." I Gottlieb v. Heyden. Chemical
Corp., 83 A.2d 595 (Del. Ch. 1951). More recently, a New Jersey corporation attempted to alter its capital stock structure by calling in the voting
stock and exchanging it for non-voting stock. The measure, passed by a
two-thirds vote of the shareholders, was challenged by members of the
dissenting minority, and the court held that the plaintiffs' right to vote was a
"basic contractual" one which the proposed action could not properly
impair, and that the plan under which the action was to be taken was
inequitable. Faunce v. Boost & Co., 83 A.2d 649 (1951).
Whether the rights of a shareholder be dubbed "vested" or "basic
contractual" would appear to be a difference only in the nomenclature
in vogue at the time and place of the decision. The more fundamental
and important consideration in this field is why and under what circumstances will the rights of a minority of shareholders be protected by judicial
application of the nomenclature. In cases where the power to amend
has been upheld, it is based upon the notion that the law existing at the
time of the contract of sale of the shares becomes a part of that contract,
and that the shareholder cannot complain about the operation of a term
implicit in his agreement.2 Upon such an analysis the real question is
TION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS-An

1. DEL. REv. CoDE, c. 65, § 26 (1935), providing in part as follows: "Any corporation . . . may . . . amend its Certificate of Incorporation . . . by changing
the . . . designations, preferences, or other relative participating, optional, or other
special rights of the shares or the qualifications, limitations or restrictions of such
rights . . . or by making any other change or alteration in its Certificate of Incorporation that may be desired . . . provided that . . .as so amended . . . [it]
shall contain only such provisions as it would be lawful and proper to insert in an
Original Certificate of Incorporation.. .."
2. STEYNs, Co~poRATIoNs § 127 (1949).
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reduced, in the absence of any express provisions, to one of interpreting
the statute, and thus would seem to afford an opportunity for the courts
to give weight to underlying policy considerations. In this connection it
should be noted that in neither of the cases here under consideration does
it seem that the statute involved would be necessarily determinative of
the cause; the terms of these statutes were sufficiently general that a dif3
ferent result in each case could have been supported with equal propriety.
In the Gottlieb case, the court reasoned that since the right to vote had
4
been held by the Delaware courts to be susceptible to change under § 26,
and since the pre-emptive right existed primarily to protect one's voting
power, 5 it must follow that if the primary right (i.e., the right to vote)
6
could be removed, the secondary right might also be removed. The Faunce
decision refuses to expose the primary right to summary disposal.
The increasing complexity of stock structure has made the preemptive right more difficult to administer fairly, with the result that it
has been afforded diminishing protection in recent years.7 If the arguments and policy approving a restriction of pre-emptive rights are sound,
it may follow that if the voting power may be thus partially impaired, the
same considerations may dictate a similar fate for the voting power as a
whole. That the right to vote may be properly withheld or regulated by
provisions in the charter or by-laws existing at the time' the stock is
purchased is clear.8 But decisions like that in the Faunwe case show a
reluctance to remove the right when it existed at the time of the stock
purchase, the reasoning being that it was a part of the contract and cannot
be removed without impairing the obligations of the contract. As a practical matter this reasoning may not be entirely sound. With the increased
diversity of ownership in large, modern corporations, and the corresponding
increase in the use of proxy voting, voting trusts, and other manipulations,
the right to vote incident to the ownership of stock becomes increasingly
less significant to the vast majority of small shareholders. 9 Under such
3. Compare DEL. REV. CODE op. cit. supra, note 1, with N.J.S.A. §§ 14: 11-1,
14:11-2 (1939), providing, inter alia, that by a two-thirds vote of the stockholders,
a corporation may "Make such other amendment, change or alteration as may be
desired." But cf. Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, Inc., 256 App. Div.
134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415, aff'd 280 N.Y. 840. 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939), holding that the preemptive right may not be removed by charter amendment unless the right to amend
appeared in specific terms in the statute.
4. Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923).
5. See 11 FLETcnER, Cyc. oF CoRPoRATIoNs § 5135 (1932), citing Drinker, The
Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARv. L. REv.
586 (1930) ; Frey, ShareholdersPre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929). But
see Svxs, CoPsoA0noNs § 111 (1949).
6. See Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 83 A.2d 595, 597 (1951).
7. Drinker, The Preimptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares,
43 HARv. L. REv. 586 (1930); Frey, Shareholders Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J.
563 (1929); 25 CoRNELL L.Q. 124 (1939). Cf. Yoakam v. Providence Biltmore
Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533, 538 (1929).
8. See, e.g., NJ.S.A. § 14: 8-1 (1939); General Investment Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 87 N.J. Eq. 234, 100 AtI. 347 (1917).
9. See STrEvEs, Coaomnoxs § 111 (1949).
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circumstances there is considerable doubt that the shareholder actually
bargains for a right to control through his vote; the bargaining may as
a matter of fact be merely for an investment on which a pecuniary return
is expected. Under this analysis it might be said that as the size and
diversity of ownership increase, the shareholder's position and interests
approach that of a bondholder or other lender, who traditionally has been
without a vote.' 0
The complex ramifications of modern corporate finance frequently
make it advantageous for a corporation to revamp its stock structure or
adjust its voting pattern to accommodate the influx of new capital or to
deal with the other exigencies incident to the running of the business. The
recognition of these factors has played a part in the restriction of the preemptive right;"1 it may not be amiss to make the voting power itself
vulnerable to the pressure of their operation. The soundness of such a
position is, of course, dependent to a large extent upon the size of the
corporation involved, and upon whether or not the stock is closely held.
But regardless of this it does not seem helpful to tag something as a
"vested" or "basic" right; it would appear more consistent with reason
to make the outcome of a case hinge upon the demands of the particular
situation. The Faunce case affords an example where this might have been
utilized. There the result of revamping the stock structure would have
been to put all the voting power in a single person, in return for a release
from a royalty agreement. 1 2 The impetus for the action was supplied by
the person who was to receive the voting power, and it was the same
person who voted 3,44O2 shares which she held as trustee, out of a total
of 5,4922 shares outstanding. 13 Under these circumstances the court held
that the plan was inequitable."4 It is submitted that the decision should
have rested on that ground alone without talk of basic contractual rights1 5
10. See BERLE and MEANS, THE MODERN

CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY

121 (1932); STEVENS, CoRPoRATiONs §§91, 111 (1949).
11. See Drinker, The Pregimptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New
Shares, 43 HARv. L. REv. 586 (1930); Frey, Shareholders Pre-emptive Rights, 38
YALE LJ. 563 (1929). See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §297 (Deering, 1941), providing
that there shall be no pre-emptive right unless expressly reserved in the charter or
by-laws.
It has been suggested that because of the public concern in the prosperity of large
corporations, the directors should be free to do what is best for the business, without
hampering by minority interests. 1 DEWING, FINANCIAL PoucY OF CORPoRATIONs
xiii (1920).
12. This was done by creating a special class of voting stock known as
Class B stock. Only 100 shares were authorized, and all were to be owned by one
person. Stipulation of facts, Schedule "C," Faunce v. Boost & Co., 83 A.2d 649

(1951).
13. Stipulation of Facts, par. 18, Faunce v. Boost & Co., 83 A.2d 649 (1951).
14. See Faunce v. Boost & Co., 83 A.2d 649, 652 (1951).
15. It is interesting to contrast the stock structure in the Faunce and Gottlieb

cases.

In the latter case, the plaintiff owned only 25 out of a total of 1,066,005 shares

of common stock, and the option plan involved was limited to 50,000 shares. It may
also be significant that the stock of the Heyden Corporation may be bought on the

New York Exchange.
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FEDERAL GIFT TAx-GIFTs IN TRUST FOR MINORS AND THE ANNUAL
EXCLUSION-PESENT INTEREST V. FUTURE INTEREST-A donor con-

sulted his attorney about his plan to make a gift to his new-born grandson.
It was agreed "there wasn't any use giving the child bills in his crib," 1"
and consequently the attorney advised the donor that he could draw a trust
instrument under which the gift could be accomplished and, at the same
time, the annual exclusion allowed by the gift tax law to gifts of present
interests could be retained. As drawn, the instrument directed the trustee
(1) to apply the income and principal as "necessary" toward the education
and support of the beneficiary, and (2) to terminate the trust and convey
the corpus, and accumulated income if any, to the beneficiary upon his
demand or the demand of a "legally appointed guardian," or upon the
beneficiary's attaining majority, whichever was first to occur. The Commissioner denied the exclusion, and the Tax Court sustained his ruling
that the gift was a future interest. 2 The circuit court reversed. The trust
was held to give the minor beneficiary a present interest in the income and
corpus. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
Another taxpayer made three separate $3,500 gifts to an irrevocable
trust for the benefit of his three children aged 4, 7, and 11. Each trust
was to continue for the life of the respective beneficiaries, to be distributed
to his estate at death, unless previously terminated as thereinafter provided.
The trustee was given a discretion during the minority of each beneficiary
to pay out or accumulate the income or principal, subject to a power in
the guardian of each beneficiary at any time to demand the accumulated
income or terminate the trust. No guardian was ever appointed. Again,
the Tax Court sustained the Commissioner in denying the annual exclusion to income and corpus as future interests8 Stifel v. Com"missioner,

17 T.C. 647 (1951).
The $3,000 exclusion under the federal gift tax law 4 does not apply
to future interests. 5 If the trust provides for distribution of the corpus
in the future, e.g., when the beneficiary attains majority, the gift as to
corpus is a future interest. 6 If the trustee is directed to distribute the
1. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 111, 112 (1950).
2. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, supra note 1.
3. The Trustee was, by Article Third, authorized to expend income or principal
in his discretion, for the benefit of the children, "as if the interest of said [beneficiary] in the trust property was held by the Trustee as guardian . . . and as if the
Trustee were making payments and distributions in that capacity. . . ." Although
this point received no mention by the Tax Court, a similar provision was held by
one federal district court to constitute a present interest in both income and principal.
Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948). However, both the
Commissioner and the Tax Court have rejected this view upon the authority of the
Fondren and Disston cases, infra note 6.
4. INT. REv. CODE § 1003(b): "Exclusions from Gifts . . . (3) . . .In the
case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property) ....
the first $3,000
of such gifts . . ."

5. U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §86.11 (1943).
6. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941) ; Fondren v. Commissioner, 324
U.S. 18 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
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income periodically to the beneficiaries, or to apply the income toward
the support of a minor beneficiary, the gift of income is a present interest7
But when the trustee is given a discretion whether to apply or accumulate
the income," or if application of income is made dependent upon necessity
of the beneficiary, which necessity is not shown to presently exist, 9 the gift
of income becomes a future interest in that there is some condition
precedent to the beneficiary's right thereto. 10 As interpreted and applied
by the Government and the courts, "future interests" encompasses all
gifts whereby "use, possession or enjoyment" is postponed for any period,
regardless of whether the number of donees is certain, or the values ascertainable, or title is vested or contingent."
In the Kieckhefer case, the direction to apply as "necessary" would,
without more, render the gift of income and corpus a future interest. But
the direction to terminate and transfer income and corpus to the beneficiary upon demand would, had the beneficiary been sui juris, render the
entire gift a present interest. It may be contended that such rights conferred on infants are necessarily future interests because of (1) a physical
inability to exercise such a right springing from a lack of understanding,
or inability to write, in tender years; (2) actual restraint on exercise by
the minor as a result of a realistic family control; although the terms may
express a right to consume, the usual family relationship entails a parental
advisory control; (3) regardless of these realistic limitations on a present
"use and enjoyment", the legal disabilities of all minors inhibit the exercise
of rights purportedly conferred upon them. The privilege of a minor to
disaffirm contracts or transfers made during minority constitutes a disability in the minor to make an effective demand inasmuch as the trustee
is under no legal duty to comply without the intervention of a guardian.
In the Kierkhefer case the circuit court held that all impediments to present
"use, possession and enjoyment" inherent in the minority status of the
beneficiary, as distinguished from those imposed by the donor, were insufficient to convert an otherwise present interest into a future interest.
In the Stifel case, the right given the beneficiary to terminate was
limited, during minority, to exercise through a guardian who was never
appointed.' 2 Court appointment of a guardian was a condition precedent
7. Fisher v. Commissioner, supra note 6. See Fondren v. Commissioner, 324
U.S. 18, 29 (1945).
8. French v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Welch v. Paine, 120
F.2d 141 (1st Cir. 1941).
9. See Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1945).
10. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945) ; Commissioner v. Disston, 325
U.S. 442 (1945); Rassas v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 160 (1951). It is submitted
that on this authority, Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F. Supp. 331 (W.D. N.C. 1951)
(court approval a prerequisite to distribution, held present interest) is erroneous.
11. See note 5 supra; Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
12. Although the Trust instrument in the Stifel case is ambiguous, it might have
been construed to authorize personal demand of the minor as to accumulated income,
requiring intervention of a guardian only for termination as to corpus. On this construction the gift as to income would then be in the same class as the entire gift in the
Kieckhefer case. Both the majority and the dissenters treated it as requiring the
guardian, both as to income and corpus.
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to an exercise of the power. Assuming, arguendo, that court appointment
of a guardian for a minor beneficiary of a trust would be granted as a
matter of course, the powers of guardians are restricted by court supervision; 13 invasion of corpus of a ward's estate is conditioned upon "cause
shown" to the court, 14 all of which are further impediments to the present
right to "use, possession, or enjoyment" of the minor.
It appears that the minimum requirement for a present interest is
that the donee must have a presently exercisable right to use and enjoy
the property. The reaction to the Commissioner's position in the Kieckhefer
case, that gifts to minors, in trust or otherwise, are being treated differently
than gifts to adults, is ill-founded. It does not follow from that position
that all gifts to minors would be future interests, or that actual managerial
competence of the minor donee is required in addition to the present legal
power to consume. No instance has been found where the Commissioner
has attempted to classify a minor's gift as a future interest on the latter
test alone. The determination of what interests are the subject of a gift,
for tax purposes, should be limited to the question of what enforceable
rights has the transaction conferred upon the donee. In the Kieckhefer
case, the beneficiary's present right to terminate and demand conveyance
was a sham. It was not presently enforceable. The distinction between
a limitation imposed by the donor and one imposed by the law is irrelevant
to the determination of the nature of the interests given to the donee. To
allow such a device to satisfy the present interest requirement supplies
a loophole for the attainment of the exclusion for gifts incapable of present
use and enjoyment. Under a presently exercisable legal power test, gifts
to minors and adults alike are subject to the same limitations upon the
annual exclusion. 15 Direct, unconditional transfers to either are gifts of
present interests. A right to demand delivery, however, is a present interest only if the donee has a present legal power to exercise that right.
If for any reason the adult donee lacks the legal power presently to exercise
such a right, that gift would likewise be a future interest. Consequently,
the disabilities incident to minority, imposed by the law for protection
of the child from his own improvidence, will, in most instances, render
a gift to the minor a future interest. Where statutes have expressly conferred presently exercisable rights upon minors, however, such gifts should
be recognized as present interests. For example, in Pennsylvania banks
are authorized to pay out funds upon the demand of a minor depositor,16
and minors over 16 years of age may own, receive dividends from, and
13.
been in
tit. 20,
14.
1950).
15.
16.

In Pennsylvania jurisdiction over the estates of minors and guardians has
the Orphans' Court since 1713. See Fiduciaries Act of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 320.1001-1086 (Purdon, 1950).
E.g., Fiduciaries Act of 1949, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.1084 (Purdon,
Cf. Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 29 (1945).
Banking Code of 1933, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 819-902 (Purdon, 1939).

908

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

redeem building and loan shares. 17 Although there may remain some question whether Congress intended to deny the exclusion to so broad an area,18
the Stifel decision appears to be the more plausible statement of the law
under the present language of § 1003(b) (3).

FUTURE INTERESTS-CLASS GIFTS-APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF
CONVENIENCE-The fifth item of testator's will provided a trust fund of

$100,000 for "each and every male child of my sons who shall by birth
inherit and bear the name of Earle." ' Two sons survived the testator.
One son had no children; the other had three sons living at testator's death,
a fourth was en ventre se mere, and a fifth was born twenty-one years
after testator's death. At the audit of the third account of the trustees of
the residuary trust-2 a claim to have a trust of $100,000 established was
presented by a court appointed guardian for the fifth son. By adjudication
of the Orphans Court of Philadelphia County the claim was dismissed on
the grounds that the class closed at testator's death. An appeal was taken
from a decree dismissing exceptions to the adjudication and from a decree
approving the schedule of distribution.3 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's decision holding the application of the rule
of convenience unnecessary since the testator's intention to have the class
remain open after his death was clearly shown by the above quoted item of
17. Building and Loan Code of 1933, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1074-608 (Purdon,
1938). Consider also: Stock Transfer Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 302 (Purdon,
1938) (Nothing in the Act shall be construed to authorize an infant to transfer securities) ; 31 CoDe FR. REGS. § 306.50 (1949) (U.S. Government bonds in name of
minor not redeemable without application of guardian, undess in the opinion of the
witnessing officer the minor is competent to receive the money).
18. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1939) ; 1939-1 INT. REV. BuL.
pt. 2 at 478; SEN. RFP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1939), 1939-1 INT. REv.
BuLL. pt. 2 at 525-526 (that the reason for limiting the exclusion to present interests
was to avoid the perplexing problem of determining the number of eventual donees
and the respective valuations of their gifts). See also 29 TAXEs 743, 748 (1951)
(suggesting legislative revision).
1. This trust was to be administered on the same terms as the trusts established
by the will for two named grand-daughters. By the terms of those trusts, if the
testator's estate after taxes amounted to at least $5,000,000 one grand-daughter was
to receive income for life from $300,000 held in trust for her and the other was to
receive the income for life from $500,000 held in trust for her. If either died leaving
issue the income was to be paid to them until the trust terminated as specified in another item of the will, see note 2 infra, whereupon the issue were to take the principal per stirpes and on failure of issue it would go to the residuary estate. In no
event were the grand-daughters to participate in the principal.
2. What was left of the estate after the designated trusts were established was
to be held in trust to pay the income to the testator's wife and children. This trust,
along with the other trusts, was to terminate twenty-one years after the death of
the longest living grandchild or great-grandchild who was living when testator died.
Note that this is the same period as the Rule against Perpetuities.
3. The Supreme Court held that the ORPHANS' COURT AcT OF 1951, effective
January 1, 1952, Act No. 263, §771 (Aug. 10, 1951), made a confirmed adjudication
final for the purpose of appeal and therefore the appeal from the schedule of distribution was unnecessary.
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the will,4 by the purpose for which the trust was created, 5 and by the use
of the word "sons" even though one son had no children at testator's
death., In re Earle's, Estate, 369 Pa. 52, 85 A.2d 90 (1951).
The rule of convenience is generally stated to be a rule of construction 7
which is applied to wills containing a class gift where the testator fails
clearly to specify a time for the class to close. The court in this situation
will terminate the class at the time of distribution, thereby excluding all
after-born members. 8 The rule has been justified on the ground that to
allow the admission of after-born members into the class would delay indefinitely the distribution of the estate and thereby frustrate the testator's
inferred desire for an early distribution. 9 Since it is a rule of construction
it would seem logical that if the testator clearly manifests an intention that
the class close before his death, e.g., at the execution of the will, ori after
his death, e.g., at the death of those who could conceive qualified members
of the class, the rule would not apply. But logic has not ruled in this field
of law. In analyzing the cases one finds that only where the gift has been
an aggregate sum 10 to a class have the courts readily complied with the
manifested desires of the testator." Where the gift to the class has been
4. The court held that the words "each and every" clearly meant all male children

of the sons and that the word "shall" denoted a future time. The court said that the

future time was that time after the testator died, completely ignoring the fact that it
could have merely referred to the period between the date of execution of the will
and the testator's death. See note 13 infra. In fact the latter was the meaning that
the court gave the word "shall" in the phrase "my estate . . . shall at least amount
to the net sum of five million dollars" used in the same paragraph.
5. Since the testator made the bearing of the family name as well as its inheritance a condition precedent, the court concluded that the primary purpose of the gift
was the perpetuation of the family name by as many male lineal decendants as possible.
6. The court stated, "The use of the plural becomes more important when we
view the extraneous circumstances of the family situation from the testator's armchair."
7. 2 SimEs, LAw OF FuTuR INTERESTS § 372 (1st ed. 1936).
8. In the following cases there was an immediate class gift: Smith v. Ashurst,
34 Ala. 208 (1859); Henderson v. Womack, 41 N.C. 437 (1849); Landwehr's Estate, 147 Pa. 121, 23 At. 348 (1892) ; Coogher v. Crosby, 89 S.C. 508, 72 S.E. 149
(1911); Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 AUt. 188 (1925).
In the following cases the will was constructed so that the entire estate could not
be distributed until the termination of a specified life estate: McLain v. Howald,
120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182; Evan's Estate, 155 Pa. 646, 26 At. 739 (1893) ; Rozell
v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922).
In all the rules as to class gifts, if a member of the group is born within the
period of gestation after the testator's death, such person is included.
9. Sim-Es, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 91 (1st ed. 1951);
Casner, Class Gifts to others than to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin," 51 HARV. L. REv.
254 (1937).
10. An example of a bequest of a set or aggregate sum would be $100,000 to the
children of A as opposed to a per capita gift which would be $1,000 to each of the
children of A.
11. Becksmith v. McAllister, 165 S.C. 1, 162 S.E. 623 (1932) (Class closed
when Will executed); Pickett v. Southerland, 60 N.C. 615 (1864); Howard v.
Napier, 3 Ga. 192 (1847) ; Toole v. Perry, 80 Ga. 681, 7 S.E. 118 (1888) ; Boehm
v. Baldwin, 221 Ill. 59, 77 N.E. 454 (1906); Kilgore v. Kilgore, 127 Ind. 276, 26
N.E. 56 (1890); Pool v. Ward, 21 Pick. 398 (Mass. 1837); Mitchell v. Long, 80
Pa. 516 (1877) ; Houston v. Schuhmann, 92 S.W.2d 1086 (Texas 1936) ; Bently v.
Ash, 59 W. Va. 641, 53 S.E. 636 (1906) ; Mogg v. Mogg, 1 Mer. 654, 35 Eng. Rep.
811 (1811).
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a per capita sum the courts have, with but one exception, 12 ignored the
manifested desires of the testator. 13 In that one exception, Parker v.
Leach,1 4 the court admitted after-born members where the meaning of the
testator's words, "to the sons of David R. Leach, begotten by him during
his natural life 15 the sum of one thousand dollars each.

.

..",

was beyond

question. In all other cases of a per capita class gift involving words of the
same connotation this has not been done.'1 The only justification for this
result is that, unlike a gift of a set sum to a closs, the participation of afterborn members in a per capita class gift would delay indefinitely the distribution of the entire estate. In the instant case, although involving a per capita
class gift, the court refused to apply the rule of convenience as a rule of law
where a logical inference 17 could be drawn that the testator desired the
class to remain open after his death. Therefore, at least in Pennsylvania,
it now appears that a clear intent on the part of the testator will abrogate
the application of the rule of convenience not only in a set sum class gift
but also in a per capita class gift.
In practically all cases it is reasonable to infer that a testator making a
gift to a class would wish to include as many members of the class as possible . 8s But it is also reasonable to infer that a testator would commonly
desire as early a distribution as is practicable.' 9 When the class could not
be kept open without a delay in the distribution of the estate the courts felt
they were faced with a dilemma.2 0 They chose to allow the inferred intent
21
of early distribution to govern, thereby developing the rule of convenience.
12. Parker v. Leach, 66 N.H. 416, 31 At. 19 (1891).
13. In the following cases there were per capita class gifts. The future language
used by the testator was held to relate to the time between the execution of the will
and his death. Parties born thereafter were excluded. Howland v. Howland, 77
Mass. 469 (1860) ("Each and every child of my said sons, respectively, who shall
be living at the time of my decease, or who may be born to them respectively after
my decease") ; Seligman v. Seligman, 89 N.Y. Misc. 194, 151 N.Y. Supp. 889
(1951) ("being or becoming the issue of my daughter") ; Pierce v. Knight, 182
Mass. 72, 64 N.E. 692 (1902) ("to each of the children of my nephews or nieces") ;
Storrs v. Benbow, 2 My. & K. 46, 39 Eng. Rep. 1862 (1833) ("to each child that
may be born to either of the children of either of my brothers, lawfully begotten") ;
Butler v. Lowe, 10 Sim. 315, 59 Eng. Rep. 636 (1893) ("begotten or to be begotten") ; Merril v. Winchester, 120 Me. 203, 113 Atl. 261 (1921) ("now living
or hereafter born") ; Ranney v. Ranney, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 77 (1899) ("now, or
hereafter born"); Ringrose v. Bramham, 2 Cox 384, Waddell v. Waddell, 68 S.C.
355, 47 S.E. 375 (1904) ("to each of my grandchildren"); Rogers v. Mutch, L.R.
10 Ch.D. 25 (1878) ("to each of the children of my niece M. who shall live to attain
the age of 21").
14. 66 N.H. 416, 31 AtI. 19 (1891).
15. Italics supplied.
16. See note 13 supra.
17. The court bolstered its argument that the testator's intent was clear from
the use of the words "each and every" by looking to the purpose for which the trust
was created and the circumstances at the time of his death. See notes 4, 5 and 6
supra.

18.
19.
20.
21.
384, 30

2 SImEs, LAW oF FuTuRE INTERE Ts § 373 (1st ed. 1936).
Ibid.
Howland v. Howland, 77 Mass. 469 (1860).
The rule, it is believed, was first stated in Ringrose v. Bramham, 2 Cox
Eng. Rep. 177 (1794).
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This motive was even stronger where the gift was per capita, and thus the
rule in this area took on the attributes of a rule of law. But like so many
apparent dilemmas there was a third alternative. The court could have
decided what the probabilities were as to future issue, set aside enough
for such issue and taken a bond from the residuary legatees to cover any
others that might unexpectedly show up. That in effect has been done in
the instant case.22 The court has distributed the estate to the respective
trusts on the death of the testator with the residuary trust being charged
with $100,000 multiplied by as many sons bearing the name "Earle" as
the two sons will beget in the future. By this simple and convenient method
the evil of delayed distribution has been surmounted, the will has remained
unaltered, and the testator's intentions have been carried out. The court,
intentionally or not, has challenged the very rationale upon which the rule
of convenience rests by clearly demonstrating that the necessity giving rise
to that rule does not exist.m This case should not be restricted to the
situation where the testator has clearly manifested an intent that the class
remain open, but should be followed where it is logical that the testator
would desire it to remain open. The only case in which this would be a
hardship is where the possibility of many future children would require the
entire estate to be held in trust to meet this expectancy. With the current
trend in America toward smaller families the probability of this occurring
seems too minute to justify the frustration of the testator's intent by the
application of an artifical rule of construction as a rule of law.

LABOR LAW-UNFAIR

LABOR PRACTICE-EMPLOYER'S

FAILURE TO

PERMIT UNION .OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK ON COMPANY TIME AND PROP-

ERTY-Six days prior to a run-off election by the employees of a New York
City department store to determine whether they would select or reject
union representation, the store's president urged rejection of the union in a
speech to the employees on company time and property. At the time the
speech was made, the store had a rule prohibiting union solicitation on the
premises. The union's request for an opportunity to address the employees
under similar circumstances-on company time and property-was not
given. The election resulted in an overwhelming defeat for the union.
22. By including after-born grandsons, the court created further problems such
as creating a not too remote possibility of violating the Rule against Perpetuities. If
such violation were to be avoided by terminating the after-born grandsons' trust
at the time the residuary trust terminated, see note 2 supra, the action would clash

with the testator's intention that the grandsons should have a life estate. See note
1 supra.
23. Cf. Defflis v. Goldschmidt, 1 Mer. 417 (1816), where a testator bequeathed
"to each of his sister's children, whether now born, or hereafter to be born, the sum
of ;E2000 each, payable at 21," and directed his executors to appropriate a fund for
payment of those legacies, the interest of such fund to be paid to his sister until the
legacies become payable. The court ordered a fund to be impounded which would
probably be sufficient for after-born children. Although this was not strictly a lump
sum gift or a per capita gift it is interesting to note that the court found no difficulty
in carrying out the testator's intention.
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Following charges by the union, the National Labor Relations Board ruled
that the failure to permit the requested address constituted an unfair labor
practice under § 8(a) (1) of the Labor Management Relations Act,' and
was a ground for setting aside the election. Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96
N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1951).
Accord, Biltmore Manufacturing Co., 97
N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1952).
The questions of the right of an employer to speak to his employees on
his own time and property, and the restrictions imposed upon him if he
does so, have resulted in contradictory Board decisions. Prior to the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act in 1947, the Board, in Clark
Brothers,2 held that an employer's speech pertaining to a labor dispute
delivered on company time and property was coercive and an unfair labor
practice. This decision was strongly criticized by Congress as being too
restrictive on the employer's right of speech, 8 and the enactment of § 8(c),
granting all parties to a labor dispute full freedom to express any opinion
they may hold, 4 was intended to overrule it. Thereafter, in Babcock &
Wilcox, 5 the Board did overrule Clark Brothers by holding that an employer could speak on his own time and property, provided that his speech
did not contain threats of reprisal or promises of benefit; however, the question of permitting a reply by the union was not in issue. Then, in S. & S.
Corrugated Paper Machinery Co.,0 although the union requested opportunity to reply, the Board decided that the employer's denial of that request
did not constitute an unfair labor practice. The instant case overrules that
decision, at least insofar as it was interpreted to mean that an employer
could always refuse the union request, and thus places further restrictions
on the employer's right to speak given by § 8(c). Two grounds were relied
upon. First, while admitting the right of the company, a department store,
to forbid all union activity on the premises because of the nature of its
business of serving large numbers of customers daily, and possible disruption of its service if it did not have that right,7 the Board felt that when
1. 49

STAT.

452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1946), as amended 61

(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1)

(Supp. 1951).

STAT.

140

2. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946).
3. ". . . The Board has placed a limited construction upon the decisions
[Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) and NLRB v. American Tube Bending
Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943), enunciating right of free speech in labor matters]
by holding such speeches by employers to be coercive . . . if the speech was
made in the plant on working time (Clark Brothers, 70 N.L.R.B. 802). The com-

mittee believes these decisions to be too restrictive and in this section [8(c)], pro-

vides that if, under all the circumstances, there is neither an expressed or implied
threat of reprisal, force, or offer of benefit, the Board shall not predicate any finding of unfair labor practice upon the statement ..
"
SEN. RaP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
4. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1946), as amended 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c) (Supp. 1951).
5. 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948).

6. 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
7. Accord, Goldblattt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948); May Department Stores
Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1946), enforcenwnt granted, 154 F.2d 533 (1946); J. L.
Hudson Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946). Unlike a department store, a maufacturing
plant, for example, cannot prohibit union solicitation during non-working hours or

on all parts of the premises.
(1945).

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793

1952]
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store officials used the same premises to conduct a campaign against the
union, their refusal of the union request resulted in a discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule. The Board analogized the instant
situation to those where an employer was found guilty of an unfair labor
practice when he enforced a no-solicitation rule as to one union but not to
another,8 or as to activities of pro-union employees but not to those of antiunion employees 9 or others.' 0 In all those cases the employer attempted
to limit debate on his property to one side. While admitting that these
cases could be distinguished from the instant one, where the alleged discrimination took the form of an employer's exercising his guaranteed right
of speech, the Board considered such a distinction inapt. The second
ground relied on, and the only one relied on in Biltmore Manufacturing
Co.,"- was that, quite apart from whether or not the employer had a nosolicitation rule, the denial of the union request operated to deprive the
employees of their right freely to choose or reject union representation
under § 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act.12 This right encompasses the right to hear both sides of the story under conditions reasonably
approximating equality.
As a result of the interpretation placed upon the instant case by Biltmore Manufacturing Co., it is clear that the reasonable equality doctrine
can be utilized whether or not the employer has a no-solicitation rule. Although the Board stated that not every employer speech will require union
reply, it failed to make clear when the requirement 'will be imposed. The
Board listed factors which will influence its decision, such as the proximity
of the employer's speech to the election, the presence of other unfair labor
practices on the employer's part, the existence of a no-solicitation rule,' 3
and the opportunities available for other means of union campaigning, but it
stated that weighing these factors must be done on a case-to-case basis. As
a result, no employer who has exercised his right of speech on his own time
and property can now accurately predict when he may deny or when he
must permit a reply by a union. This inability places him in a dilemma. If
he does permit reply he not only gives the union the advantage of the last
word, but he also doubles his loss of employee-productivity; if he does not,
8. NLRB v. Blatt, 143 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S 774

(1944); NLRB v Winona Knitting Mills, 163 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1947).
9. NLRB v. Harbison Walker Co., 135 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1943).
10. NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946) (business
men of community permitted to distribute anti-union literature on company premises,
but privilege to employees to distribute union literature denied).
11. In the Biltmore case, an employee requested opportunity to respond to employer's speech delivered two hours before an election. The Board stated that the
record "does not disclose the existence of a general no-solicitation rule and its discriminatory application as was found in the Bowit Teller case." Nevertheless, the
denial to the employee of an opportunity to speak was held to be an unfair labor
practice.
12. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946), as amended 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (Supp. 1951).
13. In utilizing the reasonable equality doctrine, the presence of a no-solicitation
rule is only a factor influencing the Board's decision, not determinative per se.
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he risks the danger of having a favorable election set aside. To compel
an employer to foot the bill for a union campaign speech and to throw open
his property to union organizers raises serious constitutional questions with
respect to the guarantees of property rights of the Fifth Amendment. It is
true that inconvenience "or even some dislocation of property rights" may
be necessary to safeguard the rights of collective bargaining. 1 4 Thus union
organizers have had the right of access to a company-owned lumber camp,' 5
aboard a ship,16 or to the only meeting hall in a company town.17 The
rationale of these decisions is a principle of necessity, there being no other
feasible way to conduct an organizational drive in those situations. But
the instant case permits the union to invade company property in New York
City, where many union halls are available and oportunities for conducting
an efficient campaign numerous. Whether the courts will go this far in
permitting "dislocation of property rights" is problematical. A Supreme
Court dictum indicates that it might not sanction the Board's position.' 8
Furthermore, this decision, by placing the employer who speaks on his own
time and property in the dilemma mentioned previously, has the practical
effect of severely circumscribing his right of speech under § 8(c), a right
which Congress did not intend to be unduly restricted. These are considerations which suggest that the Board should exercise great restraint
before setting aside elections under the reasonable equality doctrine.

LIBEL-CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE-BURDEN OF PROOF IN PENNSYLVANIA-INFORMATION SECURED FROM PUBLIC OFFICIALS AS BASIS OF

PROBABLE CAusE-In 1948, rumors were current in Philadelphia that
parking meter firms were offering bribes to public officials to secure installation of their machines. A deputy attorney general, who had been
assigned to investigate the situation, allowed defendant's reporter to scrutinize a police officer's report which stated that plaintiff, vice-president of
a meter firm, had been called the "Mata Hari of the parking meter deals"
by an attorney. After the reporter had interviewed plaintiff, who denied
the allegation, defendant printed her picture with a story that mentioned
a "Mata Hari" and observed that plaintiff was the only local woman inter14. NLRB v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1941).
15. Lake Superior Lumber Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 178 (1946).
16. See note 14 supra.
17. NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
18. Id. at 230. "We cannot equate a company-dominated North Carolina mill
town with the vast metropolitan centers where a number of halls are available within
easy reach of prospective union members." Interestingly, this dictum was written
by Mr. justice Murphy, generally considered to have been strongly pro-labor. Three
Justices (the Chief Justice, Jackson, and Reed) dissented even with the proposition
that union organizers had a right of access to the company-owned meeting hall in
the North Carolina mill town.
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ested in the meter business. Affirming the lower court's judgment for
plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that she had been defamed; that the occasion of the publicatidn was privileged because of public
interest in municipal matters; but that, since defendant had not shown
reasonable or probable cause for belief in the truth of the communication
nor proper manner of publication, the communication was not privileged.
Morgan v. The Bulletin Co., 369 Pa. 349, 85 A.2d 869 (1952).
The Pennsylvania definition of a conditionally privileged communication is one made upon a proper occasion, with a proper motive, in a proper
manner, and based upon reasonable or probable cause, 1 with the burden
on defendant to establish these four elements.2 Once the privilege has
been established, it is plaintiff's task to show abuse of it through actual
malice. 3 The first doubt of this rule's vitality was raised by the court's
quotation, in Montgomery v. Dennison,4 of the Restatement view, which
requires the defendant to prove only the privileged occasion; 5 thereafter,
plaintiff must assume the burden of showing abuse, which may be demonstrated through defendant's lack of probable cause for belief in the truth
of the defamation. 6 The court in the Dennison case also cited and failed
to distinguish the Pennsylvania rule. 7 Confusion grew when the court, in
McAndrew v. Scranton Repub. Pub. Co.,s devoted several pages of dicta
to the Restatement view 9 although it also appeared to sanction (at least
1. The term was defined in the leading case of Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404,
2 AtI. 513 (1886), except for the element of proper manner of publication, which was
added by Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times, 139 Pa. 334, 21 Ati. 154 (1891). Previous
to the Briggs case, there had been some indication that probable cause was not an
element of the privilege but merely one means of proving the actual malice necessary
to show abuse of the privilege. Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145, 2 At. 568 (1886).
2. O'Donnell v. Phila. Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A.2d 775 (1947); Hartman
v. Hyman & Lieberman, 287 Pa. 78, 134 Atl. 486 (1926); Montgomery v. New
Era Printing Co., 229 Pa. 165, 78 Att. 85 (1910); Conroy v. Pittsburgh Times,
139 Pa. 334, 21 AtI. 154 (1891). There is language in Briggs v. Garrett, suipra
note 1, both pro and con this proposition. In Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times,
215 Pa. 470, 64 AtI. 636 (1906), the court qualified the proposition by stating that
privileged occasion alone can justify the libel in the exceptional case where the publication itself negatives the presumption of malice. No cases within this exception
have been found.
3. Briggs v. Garrett, supra note 1.

4. 363 Pa. 255, 69 A.2d 520 (1949).
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 613 (2) (b) (1934).
6. RESTATEmENT, TORTS §613, comment f (1934). The Restatement view apparently is the majority one. See PROSSER, TORTS 851-852 (1941) and cases cited
therein.
7. 363 Pa. 255, 262, 69 A.2d 520, 524 (1949). However, judgment for plaintiff
would have resulted under either view, for the court held that defendant had not
established a privileged occasion. 363 Pa. 255, 264, 69 A.2d 520, 525 (1949).
8. 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780 (1950).
9. The court stated that it had adopted the Restatement view in Montgomery
v. Dennison, .supra note 4.

916

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

in part) 10 the traditional rule. In the instant case the court, without mentioning the Restatement view, expressly applies the Pennsylvania rule in
holding that defendant has the burden of showing probable cause.:"
Additional questions arise concerning the extent to which a newspaper
may rely on information secured from a public official and use the fact
of its source to show probable cause. That defendant is a newspaper
does not confer upon it any special legal privilege to defame.' 2 Although
early Pennsylvania law was to the contrary,'3 the fact that the defamation
is a repetition of another's statement, the author being named, is not a
justification. 14 However, the identity of the author may be a consideration
in determining whether defendant had probable cause to repeat the defamation, such cause being "found in circumstances of adequate probative force,
lying within personal knowledge or information derived from sources of
such a character as to lead a reasonably prudent man to regard it as
trustworthy." 15 Thus where a reputable citizen originates the accusation,' 6 it is more likely that defendant has probable cause than where an
anonymous phone call is his source. 17 The few Pennsylvania cases on the
subject do not indicate clearly whether the fact that defendant's source
is official is accorded any greater weight in determining whether probable
cause existed than that given when the information is from a responsible
private citizen. Where judgment has been for plaintiff, there has been,
in addition to want of probable cause, improper manner of publication
(as in the instant case), I. or the official was a minor one. 19 Judgment
10. The court stated that since the trial court considered the occasion privileged
and the motive and manner of publication proper, the burden passed to plaintiff to
show abuse. In dissenting, Mr. Justice Jones pointed out that, in addition, defendant
had to show the fourth element of probable cause before the burden shifted.
11. This case does not eliminate the confusion entirely since the court fails to
repudiate the Restatement view and cites in support of the Pennsylvania rule those
pages of the Montgonwry and McAndrew cases where the Restatement view is expounded. A petition for reargument, noting this anomaly, has been denied, and these
citations have been stricken from the advance sheets of the official reports. For the
merits of the Pennsylvania rule, see 98 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 931 (1950).
12. Neeb v. Hope, 111 Pa. 145, 154, 2 Atl. 568, 572 (1885).
13. Kennedy v. Gregory, 1 Binn. 84 (1803), overruled by Pease v. Shippen, 80
Pa. 513 (1877). The theory of the early view was that plaintiff could sue the author
of the defamation if defendant named him when repeating it.
14. Clark v. North Amer. Co., 203 Pa. 346, 353, 53 Atl. 237, 239 (1902) ; Pease
v. Shippen, szpra note 13. See PRossER, ToRTs 812 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 578, comments b and c (1934).
15. McGeary v. Leader Pub. Co., 52 Pa. Super. 35, 48 (1912) ; Com. v. Swallow,
8 Pa. Super. 539, 605 (1898). Whether probable cause existed is a question for the
jury. Williams v. Kroger Groc. & Bak. Co., 133 Pa. Super. 1, 11, 1 A.2d 495, 500
(1938), aff'd, 337 Pa. 17, 10 A.2d 8 (1940).
16. Briggs v. Garrett, supra note 1.
17. Montgomery v. Dennison, supra note 4.
18. McGeary v. Leader Pub. Co., supra note 15, where it was deemed improper
to publish "flaming red headlines" indicating plaintiff was arrested when a pregnant
woman was kicked. In the instant case, an improper manner was found
in the
"cheesecake" picture imputing "racy conduct" to plaintiff. [Record, p. 4 73a].
19. Neeb v. Hope, supra note 1 (clerk to the county commissioners).
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has been given for defendant where there was no evidence of improper
manner, 20 even though the reporter knew that the official's information
was derived from a third person 2 ' (as in the instant case). In so far
as these cases present any view, they seem to indicate that the instant
case does not necessarily prohibit defendant's giving considerable credit
to an official source, even though the officer's knowledge is derived from
other persons, but holds merely that such credit is overcome when there
is improper manner of publication and defendant actually knows the insufficiency of the facts in the official's possession.22 It is important that
the official character of defendant's source be given great weight in the
determination of probable cause. A newspaper should not be subjected
to undue risk of loss of its conditional privilege when, in good faith, it
relies on information given it by a public officer who has secured it in the
course of duty, such information not being incredible and the manner of
publication not being improper. Where the matter in question is of vital
public interest, probable cause should be construed liberally to protect the
publisher.

PROCEDURE-DIscovERY AGAINST THiE GOVERNMENT-PRIVILEGE FOR

recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the 3rd
Circuit' has presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify
the unsettled case law surrounding efforts by parties and courts to compel
disclosure of official records in the hands of federal agencies. 2 Several
factors militate at the present time toward the enunciation of a workable
rule to guide district courts in the recurrent situation where evidence needed
at trial is in the sole possession of the government whose agents refuse
to produce it. 3 The government has become a depository for many documents important in the determination of civil or criminal liability because
STATE SECRETS-A

26. Ferber v. Gazette & Bull. Pub. Co., 212 Pa. 367, 61 Atl. 939 (1905).
21. Benjamin v. Press Pub. Co., 70 Pittsburgh 309 (1921).
22. The lower court found that defendant's only basis for the libel was the statement made by the attorney to the police officer. [Record, p. 407a].
1. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3rd Cir. Dec. 11, 1951). Certiorari has been petitioned.
2. The confusion in the cases has often been commented on. See, e.g., 8 WIGMoRF, EVIDENCE § 2378a (3d ed. 1940) ; Street, Tort Liability of the State, 47 MICH.
L. Rnv. 341, 360 (1949); Note, 58 YALE L.J. 993 (1949). The absence of a controlling statute has also been noted. See 4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrlCE § 26.25[4]

(1950) ; Street, supra.

3. The reluctance of government agencies to submit their files to judicial process
is a concern of both legal writers and judges. See Berger and Krash, Government
Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1950) ; Yankwich, Observations on
Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165, 168 (1950). The immunity from disclosure
is generally based on an asserted privilege of yet undecided scope, but unrelated to
the government's substantive immunity from suit. See 8 WiGmoRa, op. cit. supra

note 2, §2367.
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of the broadened scope of federal activity in the past two decades. The
government has also become directly engaged in an increasing amount of
civil litigation during these years, 4 both as plaintiff and as defendant 11
where Congress has consented that the government be sued. The policy
of statutes waiving sovereign immunity from suit, such as the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946,6 seems directed at holding the government to the
personal responsibility of private litigants. Moreover, the widespread use
since 1938 of discovery devices under the Federal Rules,7 since the discovery Rules are fully applicable to the government s supplies private parties
with more effective means of forcing the government's hand. These developments would seem to suggest a policy of liberal disclosure for all
matter relevant to liability, even though held by the government. Simultaneous with these developments, however, and in addition to the usual
pressures against invading administrative files, has grown the very real
need in the current world situation to guard against any unnecessary security risk. 9 Today the overwhelming bulk of all federal activity is directed
at national defense, 10 where the argument against disclosure of official
documents is strongest."- Despite these impelling factors there exists no
clear, authoritative policy-at least none devised with a view to present
necessities-for the judicial treatment of the opposed social interests of
the government in protecting its defense secrets and of the courts in de12
ciding litigation on the basis of all available facts.
In this contemporary context, three widows of civilian observers killed
in the same bomber crash brought suit against the government under the
4. Total civil cases terminated in all district courts during fiscal year where the
United States was party:
21,397
1950
13,325 (19,849 incl. OPA enforcement)
1944
12,120
1938
1932
13,720 (29,591 incl. prohibition enforcement)
8,680 (17,236 incl. prohibtion enforcement)
1926
5,526
1920
4,500 (estimated)
1914
Sources: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS; A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, Part II (A.L.I. 1934).
5. Civil cases terminated in all district courts during fiscal year where the
United States was party-defendant:
Under Tort Claims Act
Total

1950
1949

4,214
4,321

870
735

1948

4,536

490

4,039
3,358
2,694
Source: ANNUAL REPORTS, note 4 supra.
6. 60 STAT. 842, 28 U.S.C. § 921 (1946).
1947
1946
1940

38
0
0

See Note, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
Congress had earlier waived governmental immunity from suits on contract claims
in the Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1949),
and on maritime torts in the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
§ 742 (1946). Government corporations may generally sue and be sued in their own

names.

See Keifer & Keifer v. RFC. 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
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Federal Tort Claims Act for the alleged wrongful deaths of their husbands.
The purpose of the ill-fated bomber's flight had been to test secret electronics equipment. The district court ordered the government, on motion
under Federal Rule 34,13 to produce the official investigation report on
7. According to a study of six elected district courts, discovery under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 was used in over 259o of all cases filed during
1948, although only 4% of the cases called for production or inspection. The use of
discovery was made in almost one-third of the Tort Claims Act cases alone. Speck,
The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1146
(1951).
8. See Sherwood v. United States, 112 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1940); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1942). See Pike and
Fischer, Discovery against Federal Ageicies, 56 HAav. L. REv. 1125, 1131 (1943),
in rebuttal to O'Reilly, Discovery against thw United States: A New Aspect of
Sovereign Immunity?, 21 N.C.L. REv. 1, 7 (1942). Moore approves of the interpretation that the discovery Rules apply to the United States. 4 MooRE, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 26.05.
9. The present Supreme Court has already demonstrated its sensitivity to the
world tension where substantive rights and not merely procedural conveniences are
involved. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). It took judicial notice of
the Communist danger to interstate commerce in American Communications Assn.,
C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
10. The President's budget for 1953 calls for an allocation of 76% of the estimated 85 billion dollars total expenditures to national security purposes. This compares with an actual 50% in 1950, 65% in 1949, and an estimated 70% in 1952 going
to such categories as the military services, international security-foreign relations,
and atomic energy development. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1952, p. 1, col. 8, p. 20, col. 2.
In the obvious area of national secrecy where the AEC is concerned the problems of
proof faced by parties and courts are acute. For an excellent discussion, see Haydock, Sonw Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements,
61 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1948).
11. The mounting concern over leakage of vital defense information, evidenced
especially during the MacArthur hearings, led to the controversial Executive Order
No. 10290, 16 FED. REG. 9795 (Sep. 24, 1951), which was intended to prevent "unauthorized disclosure" of official information affecting the national security, but contained a broad provision for delegation of authority to withhold disclosure (§ 24).
The Order received a storm of protest from the press, N.Y. Times, Sep. 26, 1951,
p. 17, col. 6, which pointed to the anti-democratic character of administrative
secrecy, the Order's sweeping coverage of the entire Executive Branch, and the discretionary power placed in minor officials. N.Y. Times, Sep. 28, 1951, p. 30, col. 1.
The objections of the press appeared well directed when the President was almost
immediately prompted to rescind an OPS regulation banning the publication of any
news which "might prove embarrassing to the O.P.S.," and to point out that such
a regulation was not within the purpose of his Order. See N.Y. Times, Sep. 28,
1951, p. 1, col. 6. The Order nowhere refers to the effect of judicial process through
discovery on matter covered by the Order, although this does raise a problem in construction. See instant case at 995, and text infra at note 18.
12. The most recent case before the Supreme Court squarely raising the issue of
discovery against the government resulted in a per curiam decision by an equally
divided court. The result was to affirm the dismissal of an 'antitrust suit because of
the government's failure to produce an FBI document for the court's inspection. Mr.
Justice Clarke took no part in the decision. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators
Committee, 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). But cf.
United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951) (contempt order against
FBI agent for failure to produce investigation reports in habeas corpus proceeding
reversed).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 34. The Rule requires a showing of "good cause" to sustain
a motion for the production of designated documents "not privileged." The district
court found that the plaintiffs' lack of access to information on the crash, and the
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the crash. 14 The Secretary of the Air Force raised a double claim of privilege against disclosure of the report: that government "housekeeping"
files subject to appropriate departmental regulation were protected by a
blanket immunity from discovery, and that government documents determined by the executive department to contain state secrets of a military
character were specifically immune from discovery. The Court of Appeals
rejected the first claimed privilege as non-existent and contrary to public
policy, and decided that the second existed only insofar as the court, and
not the Air Force, found military secrecy to be involved. Since the government elected not to produce the report at all, judgment against the
United States under Federal Rule 3715 was affirmed. Reynolds v. United
States, 192 F.2d 987 (3rd Cir. 1951).
In asserting ' general "housekeeping" privilege ' the government
relied on two Supreme Court decisions 17 interpreting an early statute
which granted executive departments power to adopt regulations for the
custody of their records.' 8 Pursuant to this statute many departments have
adopted regulations forbidding subordinate employees to comply with a
court order for disclosure of official information without the assent of the
department head. 19 The Supreme Court, in holding these executive regulations effective against judicial process, has forced private litigants where
the government is not a party to the action, and who are therefore without
the aid of Federal Rule 34,20 to resort to a subpoena duces tecum against
the department head. This procedure meets in most cases an insuperable
jurisdictional limitation. The procedural block to private litigants created
by these cases, however, does help the Court to avoid the serious constrong probative value of the report of a board of investigators appointed by the
Air Force, constituted good cause, and the circuit court affirmed on this point. Instant case at 991.
14. 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) provides for consequences othe'r than contempt for
refusal to make discovery. It permits the court to take as established the claim of the
party obtaining the order in respect to matters sought to be discovered, and to prohibit the introduction of contrary evidence by the disobedient party. The court did
both in this case rather than enter a default judgment, which is prohibited against
the United States by Rule 55(e).
16. See Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
17. Instant case at 992. In Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900), it was
held that a state court could not compel disclosure of official federal documents by
holding a Treasury Department agent in contempt. In Untied States ex rel. Touhy
v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), it was held that a federal court could not compel disclosure of official federal documents by holding a Justice Department agent in contempt.
18. REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. §22 (1946).
19. See, e.g., the Air Force regulations cited in the instant case at 992; a Navy
regulation in Bank Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1947) ; a justice
Dep't regulation in Ex parte Sackett, 74 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 1935). See also
note 11 sufpra.
20. FEm. R. Civ. P. 34 (procedure for production of documents) is applicable only
to parties. Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Holod, 29 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa. 1939)
(government officials cannot be compelled to produce official documents in action
to which United States is not a party).
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stitutional question of whether a court can hold a member of the executive
branch in his official capacity in contempt for failure to comply with judicial
order. 21 Whatever merit the procedural obstacle may have by avoiding
the issue of contempt against a government official, that merit is lost where
the government itself is litigant, since there is no need to compel disclosure
where the court can impose burdens on the government's case for refusal to
make discovery. 22 Courts are apparently quite willing to adopt this means of
enforcement.23

The "housekeeping" doctrine, questionable at best,24 should

not be extended beyond cases between private parties. 2 5 The court
wisely refused to expand the doctrine in the instant case. It would seem
that a claim of privilege based on the pragmatic need for military or diplomatic secrecy in the circumstances of the particular case, made by the
actual custodian of the documents, might reach a better result.2 6

The privilege 27 for state secrets of a military or diplomatic character
is a more vital objection to disclosure in light of present national defense
considerations. The use of this privilege, however, is not without problems. Discovery devices, enforceable by an adverse judgment, might
give litigious plaintiffs an unfair advantage where the government has an
adequate defense, but the defense is inseparable from matter of a highly
secretive nature. On the other hand national security has become a pervasive concept susceptible to abuse in its name, and to allow the assertion of
military secrecy to serve as a complete defense to a bona fide claim against
the government would place many injured persons at an unfair disadvantage. The primary question in resolving these opposed interests is
who is to decide whether the privilege exists in a particular case. 28 The
most recently expressed English view is that the courts cannot question
a minister's determination that disclosure of an official document would
21. Cf. Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623, 638 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 341 U.S.

737 (1951).

22. See note 15 supra.
23. Instant case at 993; United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Committee,
9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949) (dismissal of government's complaint), af'd, 339
U.S. 940 (1950); Bank Line v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(dictum: recovery against government). But cf. Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5 F.R.D.
51 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (discovery denied in action in which United States was not a
party).
24. The interpretation of REv. STAT. § 161 in the two cases cited in note 16
.rupra as permitting regulations that affect the external relation of the department
with a court is certainly not a necessary one. The statute explicitly states that regulations authorized by it must be "not inconsistent with law." See Zimmerman v.
Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Hawaii 1947), 58 YALE L.J. 993 (1949).
25. See Wunderly v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 356 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
26. Courts have construed good cause strictly to prevent unnecessary harassment of administrative files. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949)
(accessible impartial witnesses prevent discovery against government), reversing
O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (policy of Suits in
Admiralty Act overrides departmental regulation under 5 U.S.C. § 22).
27. It is a common law privilege which may be waived. Gorin v. United States,
111 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1940). See 8 WIGmoRE, op. cit. stpra note 2, § 2378.
28. See Comment, Discovery of Government Documents under the Federal Rules,
18 U. oF CmI. L. REv. 122 (1950) ; Haydock, supra note 10.
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prejudice the public interest.2 9 The United States Attorney General has
consistently held to the same position, 30 but critical opinion 3' and several
federal cases 32 affirm the decisive role of the judge in determining the
validity of the claim of privilege in any particular case. Compelling production of official documents does not necessarily entail their publication
in the record of the trial. The documents may be shown to the judge
in camera, as suggested in the instant case 3 3 and elsewhere. 4 The judge
then rules on the question of whether the documents contain privileged
matter relating to state secrets in the same role in which he rules on the
assertion of any other evidentiary privilege. The courts apparently feel
that the supremacy of the judiciary over justiciable controversies would be
surrendered in permitting an executive to determine the validity of his own
asserted privilege, even though his expert knowledge might be necessary
for the determination. 3 5 A cooperative attitude between court and government will be needed, and should be encouraged in this area of delicate
adjustment between the judicial concern for fair trial and the executive
concern for national defense.

PROCEDURE-WRIT OF PROHIBiTION-DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL
DISTRIcT COURT JUDGE ON GROUND OF BIAs-An indictment charging a
conspiracy 1 to violate the Smith Act 2 was filed in respondent judge's District Court for the Southern District of California. Defendants filed an
affidavit charging bias.3

Upon respondent's ruling that their affidavit was

29. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] 1 All E.R. 587 (H.L.) (submarine
plans). One American writer saw this decision as part of a questionable wartime
trend in English cases, even though the particular result might have been sound.
See Note, Adininistrative Discretion and Civil Liberties in England, 56 HARv. L.
REv. 806 (1943). It was disapproved in the instant case at 997.
30. 40 Ops. Arr'y GEN. 45 (1941) ; 25 OPs. Ar'y GEN. 326 (1905) ; 13 Ops.
ATT'Y GEN. 539 (1871).
31. Pike and Fisher, supra note 8; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rules 227, 228
(1942) ; 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2379.
32. E.g., Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950); Cresmer
v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. N.Y. 1948) ; Fleming v. Bernardi, 4 F.R.D.
270 (N.D. Ohio 1941). Contra: Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583
(E.D. N.Y. 1939) ; Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673 (1937) (same case).
33. Instant case at 997.
34. See, e.g., Berger and Krash, supra note 3 at 1463; 8 WiGmopx, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 2379; Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 256 (W.D. La. 1950).
35. Instant case at 997. See 4 Moore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 26.25 [6]. See Bank
Line v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1947).
1. 35 STAT. 1096 (1909), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §371 (Supp. 1950).
2. 54 STAT. 670, 671 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (Supp. 1950).
3. "Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has
a personal bias . . . against him . . . such judge shall proceed no further therein,
but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding." 36 STAT. 1090 (1911),
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (Supp. 1950).
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legally insufficient, defendants sought a writ of prohibition from the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The writ was granted, forbidding respondent from exercising any jurisdiction over the defendants. Connelly
v. United States District Court, 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951).
The writ of prohibition was first used to confine the ecclesiastical
courts to the exercise of possessed judicial powers, and so to strengthen the
King's Courts.4 By the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 the
circuit courts of the United States were vested with power to issue writs
necessary for their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law." 5 But in the federal judicial system a "final
decision" is normally required as a condition precedent to appeal, 6 to avoid
vexatious interruptions of trial progress 7 and overburdened appellate
calendars." Therefore prohibition may issue only when necessary for the
protection of, 9 or in aid of,'. appellate jurisdiction. One situation classed
within such protection of appellate jurisdiction is where the right of appeal
exists but special circumstances justify a departure from the regular course
of judicial procedure." So far as the reported federal decisions show, however, no petition for a writ of prohibition directed to a district court judge
who rejected an affidavit of bias had ever been granted prior to the instant
case. 12 Of course where the judge ruled against the affiant, his action could
be excepted to and assigned as error when the case was appealed, and
several decisions had indicated that, although the remedy of appeal exists
in these cases, the writ of prohibition might issue as a substitute where
"special circumstances exist." -1 What circumstances would suffice were
never indicated.
Certainly this case points to the most economical and efficient method
of disposing of the problem which arises when a district court judge refuses
to remove himself in the face of a timely and sufficient affidavit. A require4. See: 2

POLLOCK AND MAITLAND,

HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW

196 (1895);

Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian,20 MIm. L. REv. 272 (1936);
Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in. English Law, 32 YALz L.J. 528 (1923).

5. 1

STAT.

81 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. 1950).,

6. 26

STAT. 828 (1891), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1949).
U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 451 (1951).

See 100

7. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945).
8. See Morgantown v. Royal Insurance Co., 169 F.2d 713, 715 (4th Cir. 1948).
9. ip re Eiler's Music House, 284 Fed. 815 (9th Cir. 1922); Muir v. Chatfield,
255 Fed. 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1918).
10. Wabash Railroad Co. v. Duncan, 170 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 904 (1949) ; In re Kilpatrick, 167 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Zell v. Judges
of Circuit Court of United States for Eastern District of Virginia, 149 Fed. 86 (4th
Cir.), aff'd, 203 U.S. 577 (1906).
11. Osage Oil and Refining Co. v. Continental Oil Co. et at., 34 F.2d 585, 588
(10th Cir. 1929). See Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co. et al. v. Molyneaux, District
Judge, 70 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1934).

12. Perphaps the writ has been granted in several unreported cases. See Eisler
v. United States, 170 F.2d 273, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
13. Hurd et al. v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; In re Lisman et a!.,
89 F.2d 898, 899 (2d Cir 1937) ; United States v. Gilbert et al., 29 F. Supp. 507, 509
(S.D. Ohio 1939); In re Wingert, 22 F. Supp. 483, 484 (D. Md. 1938); United
States v. Murphy et al., 19 F. Supp. 987, 988 (W.D. Mo. 1937).
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ment that the trial court's disposition of the affidavit might be reviewed
only upon appeal from final judgment would give rise to needless expense
and delay.' 4 Since a party may file only one such affidavit in any case,' 5
so that he is stuck with the second judge if he has successfully ousted the
first, it is unlikely that prohibition would be sought except where felt to be
genuinely necessary by the affiant.'5 In addition, under the federal bias
statute the courts may consider only the legal sufficiency and timeliness of
the affidavit and are precluded from any inquiry into the truth of the facts
alleged.' 7 Prompt review would serve to mitigate any tendency of the
appellate court to consider matters aliu-nde the affidavit, such as the truth
of the averments contained therein, and their actual effect upon the progress
of the trial which has already occurred when the appeal is taken. Resistance
to the use of the writ seems to be due to the common law taboo that it must
not be used where a remedy by appeal is available.' 8 Modern principles
of procedure require that the availability of a remedy should be determined
by its utility in a given category of cases rather than by resort to ancient
dogma.

WILLs--GIFT TO AN EXISTING INTER Vivos TRUST-VARIATION OF
THE WORDS OF REFERENcE-In 1930 the testator created an inter vivos
trust with a life estate in himself and a reserved power to alter, amend or
revoke. He exercised his power to amend in 1934 and made the appellant
the beneficiary. In 1936 he revoked the 1934 amendment and made the
appellee the beneficiary. In a subsequent amendment he referred to the
trust agreement with enumerated amendments including the 1934 amendment and omitting the 1936 amendment. Of even date with the final
amendment he executed a codicil to his will giving the residue of his estate
to the trustee to be distributed as part of the corpus of the trust estate. In
describing the trust he again enumerated the amendments, including the
1934, but failing to include the 1936, amendment. On request for construction of the trust and will, the court below admitted testimony of the
scrivener tending to show that the enumeration of the 1934 amendment was
an inadvertent error. On the strength of this, the court held that the trust
14. "The writ of prohibition aida this appellate jurisdiction of ours by preventing
a useless appeal in the event of the conviction in a prosecution presided over by a
trial judge exercising a jurisdiction he does not possess." Instant case at 693, n.1.
The circuit courts of appeals, either by rule or practice, grant petitions for the writ
of prohibition priority over other civil causes on their hearing dockets. See, e.g.,
RULES OF THE UNITED STATES CIRcUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRcurr
18 (1942).
15. 36 STAT. 1090 (1911), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (Supp. 1950).
16. The court in Berger v. United States pointed to perjury statutes and disbarment proceedings as additional safeguards against the filing of frivolous affidavits.
255 U.S. 22, 35 (1921).
17. See Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 84 (7th Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
Parker et a., 23 F. Supp. 880, 882 (D. N.J. 1938). See note 3 supra.
18. Comment, 41 MicH. L. Rxv. 937, 942 (1943).
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included the 1936 amendment and the will effectively disposed of the residue
in accordance with said interpretation of the trust. The Supreme Court
of Illinois affirmed, three judges dissenting as to the will on the ground
that such a holding was in violation of the statute of wills. Continental
Illiwis Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Art Institute of Chicago, 409
Ill. 481, 100 N.E.2d 625 (1951).
There are at least two distinct devices which are frequently employed
by courts to sustain testamentary gifts in accordance with the terms of
an inter vivos trust.' The most frequent device is that of incorporation
by reference. If the will itself refers to the document as being in existence
at the time of execution, and it was in fact in existence and is reasonably
identified, then it will be held effective to control the disposition of property even though the trust instrument was not executed in compliance
with the statute of wills.2 A second device used when incorporation by
reference is not available, either because the doctrine is not recognized
in the jurisdiction or when its required elements are not present, is that
of independent significance. This device is based on the assumption that
the non-testamentary nature of the existing inter vivos trust can be used
to give meaning to the words of the will without incurring the risks which
the formalities of the statute of wills were designed to avoid.3 In the use
of this device the courts frequently regard the gift as one to the trustee
as a legal entity with evidence of the terms of the trust serving to identify
the legatee.4
The court in the instant case sustained a gift in accordance with the
inter vivos trust as interpreted by the court, not as described in the will.
The court does not dearly indicate on which of the theories it was proceeding. The dissent assumes it was incorporation by reference. If such
were the case, it presents the difficulty of incorporating a trust the attributes of which do not wholly correspond to that described in the will.
Such a discrepancy would normally preclude the use of incorporation by
reference. 5 If, however, the court viewed the bequest as a gift to an exist1. There is a substantial question whether gifts in accordance with the terms of
amendable trusts may be sustained in any event. That issue was not argued or

decided in the instant case. 343 Ill. App. 635 (1951). For opposing views on the
matter compare Palmer, Testamentary Disposition To the Trustee of An Inter
Vivos Trust, 50 MicH. L. Rlv. 33 (1951) with Lauritzen, Can a Revocable Trust
Be Incorporated by Reference, 45 ILL. L. REv. 583 (1950).
2. See Wagner v. Clauson, 399 Ill. 409, 78 N.E.2d 203 (1948) ; Keeler v. Merchants' Trust Co., 253 Ill. 528, 535, 536, 97 N.E. 1061, 1062, 1063 (1912); 1 PAGE,
WiLLs § 250 (3d ed. 1941).
3. 1 ScoTT, TRusts 292 (1939); 1 PAGE, WILLS § 268 (3d ed. 1941).
4. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 1, 193 P.2d
721 (1948) ; Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (1928) ; Matter
of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
5. "An existing writing may by reference be incorporated into and made a part
of a will. But before such an extrinsic document may be so incorporated the description of it in the will itself must be so clear, explicit and unambiguous as to leave
its identity free from doubt." Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337, 342, 55 Pac. 1011, 1012

(1899).

"A will may adopt an existing paper by reference thereof . . . but it must be so
identified by the instrument as not to admit of a contrary conclusion." Seiter's Estate, 265 Pa. 202, 206, 108 Atl. 614, 615 (1919).
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ing legal entity, a result which almost certainly 'comports with the expressed intention of the testator, the result finds support in the cases.6
There was no existing trust which exactly corresponded to the description
in the will. There was, however, a trust suffiiently similar to be identified,
and with differences which were readily explainable by the consideration
of evidence properly admissible to explain such conflicts.7 The alternative
result would have been to declare a testamentary trust having terms different from the existing inter vivos trust as found by the court-a result
clearly at odds with the intention of the testator.8 The means adopted by
the court has the merit of following the testator's intent while not doing
violence to the protections of the statute of wills.
6. See cases cited note 4 supra.
7. E.g., Norton v. Jordon, 360 Ill. 419, 196 N.E. 475 (1936); Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 IIl. 116, 40 N.E. 553 (1895).
8. The will clearly stated that "said trustee shall receive the [gift] as a portion
of the principal or corpus of said trust estate, and shall distribute the same as part
thereof." Instant case at 490, 100 N.E.2d at 630.

